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INTRODUCTION
Following its emergence as a legal entity, the corporation rapidly has come to
exhibit characteristic behavior patterns Some of these reflect its contacts with
other societal institutions; some, its internal functioning. While the former have
vital consequences for the law generally, they are ordinarily beyond and only in-
directly affect the traditional field of corporation law. With respect to the latter,
however, corporation law, and in particular the roles it defines for management and
shareholders, is directly involved.
The title of this symposium suggests the thesis that corporation law today has,
in a number of areas, developed a "new look." The specific questions here posed
for consideration are: Is a "new look" to be found in the relative positions in
which present-day statutes cast management and shareholders; and, if so, in what
respects does it differ from prior modes? And more important for society generally,
in so far as data have been collected, does this "new look" harmonize with current
corporate behavior? Is it likely to conduce socially desirable management and share-
holder behavior?
Answers to these questions may be sought by examining the provisions of con-
temporary corporation statutes defining the powers of management and share-
holders, noting current characteristics of corporate behavior, and evaluating the
former in light of the latter.
I
LAW
In an effort to ascertain the nature and extent of the management-shareholder
"new look" as enacted into sections of contemporary corporation statutes, it is
proposed first to note the provisions applicable to management and then those
relating to shareholders. While the so-called Model Business Corporation Act, as
prepared, publicized, and otherwise promoted by the Committee on Corporate Laws
of the American Bar Association has been critically commented upon by a number
*A.B. 1938, University of Akron; LL.B. 1940, Western Reserve University; Kenneson Fellow, Sum-
mers 1955-57, LL.M. i957, and candidate for J.S.D., New York University. Member of the Ohio bar;
Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. Co-author, [with Franklin C. Latcham] Ss-AtOnLDE
DEMOCRACY: A BROADER OUTLOOK FOR CORPORATIONS (1954). Contributor to legal periodicals.
'See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPrTALIsT REvoLtrON (1954); ADOLF A. BERLE,
JR., AND GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
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of persons,' the fact that since 1951 it has been adopted substantially in toto by seven
jurisdictionsO strongly suggests that it must be regarded as exemplifying con-
temporaneous corporation statutes For purposes of delineating and distinguishing
its "new look," it may be compared with the Uniform Business Corporation Act
approved nearly thirty years ago by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Although the Uniform Act has been adopted by only four states," this may, in large
part, be attributable to the fact that the Commissioners, unlike the American Bar
Association, make no active effort to obtain passage of their proposed legislation.
A. Management Provisions
The Uniform Act, like many other corporation statutes, provides that "the
business of every corporation shall be managed by a board of ... directors. . .. "'
Similarly, the Model Act states "the business and affairs of a corporation shall be
managed by a board of directors."' If inquiry were to cease with consideration of
these provisions, the conclusion would be inescapable that thirty years have brought
no "new look" to the management-shareholder sector. In fact, it could logically be
observed that the very breadth and scope of these provisions make it difficult to
imagine how more sweeping powers could be conferred on management. Indeed,
other considerations aside, their all-inclusive language might even suggest that if any
changes were to be expected, they could only take the form of limitations on man-
agement's powers. This has not been the case, however, and management powers
continue to be extensive, as they always have been and as, perhaps, they always
must be.
What, then, of the shareholder provisions of the Uniform and Model Acts?
B. Shareholder Provisions
Analysis of the shareholder provisions of the two acts may be approached from
the standpoint of the expression they give to the traditional rights of the shareholder
to elect directors and vote fundamental changes. To these there may also be added
-'Wright, Current Developments in Statutory Corporation Lawu, 7 MIA1MI L. Q 1, 6-13 (s952);
Harris, The Model Business Corporation Act-Invitation to Irresponsibility? 50 Nw. U. L. REV. i
(i955); Dykstra, Gaps, Ambiguities, and Pitfalls in the Utah Corporation Code, 4 UTAH L. REV. 439, 455
(1955); Emerson, Vital Weaknesses 0 the New Virginia Corporation Law and the Model Act, 42 VA.
L. REV. 489 (1956); Emerson and Latcham, Law and the Future: Corporation Late, 51 Nw. U. L. REv.
196, X99-200 (1956).
'They are: Wisconsin (951), Oregon (1953), District of Columbia (954), Texas (1954), Virginia
(x956), North Dakota (1957), and Colorado (1958).
'Two states recently revised and amended their corporation statutes extensively, but did not adopt the
Model Act. They are: North Carolina (1957) and Ohio (1955). See Latty, Powers, and Breckenridge,
The Proposed North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 33 N.C. L. REv. 26 (1954); Emerson, The
New Ohio General Corporation Law: Some Comments and Some Comparisons, 24 U. C. L. REv. 463
(955). The North Carolina statute is an especially excellent piece of work.
"9 U.L.A. 115 (1957). This Act has since been redesignated a model act, but to obviate confusion,
it will be referred to hereinafter as Uniform Business Corporation Act.
'They are: Louisiana (1928), Idaho (1929), Washington (1933), and Kentucky (1946). 9 U.L.A.
X15 (1957).
7 UNipo, BUSINESS CoePoRAT=ON Aar § 31-I.
'MODEL BUSiNESS CoRPoRAsoN Aar § 33.
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the obligation of disclosure to and the right of participation by shareholders. While
another traditional right of the shareholder is his right to receive dividends, it may
be excluded from consideration, in light of the fact that dividends are the subject
of another article in this symposiumY
i. Election of directors
Crucial here is the method by which shareholders may elect or remove directors
and the nature and extent of any limitations upon their voting rights. This involves
the matters of straight and cumulative voting, the frustration of cumulative voting
by such devices as classification' ° and reduction in the number of directors, and
the requirements for removal of directors.
The Uniform Act unqualifiedly provides for cumulative voting," and renders
it impossible for management to deprive shareholders of this right by means of
articles or charter restrictions or otherwise. The Model Act also initially provided
for mandatory cumulative voting,' but optional provisions for so-called permissive
cumulative voting were adopted in 19553 In this regard, therefore, the Model Act
has a different, although hardly a "new" look, in that it alternatively contemplates
only straight voting and the resultant absence of board representation for minority
shareholders.
Apart from denying it by charter or articles provisions, cumulative voting may
also effectively be vitiated by classification of directors and reduction of their
number. The Uniform Act does not expressly recognize these techniques, but the
Model Act specifically allows the former' 4 and, moreover, affords no protection
against the latter. It is, thus, apparent that cumulative voting not only may be
denied shareholders under the Model Act, but, even where granted, may be seriously
limited as a consequence of possible classification and reduction in the number of
directors. These Model Act provisions, furthermore, diverge philosophically from
the statutes requiring annual election of directors' 5 and permitting reduction in their
number, as in the case of their removal,'6 only with appropriate safeguards for
cumulative voting.17
Although the Uniform Act provides for special meetings of shareholders,'
it contains no provision for the removal of directors without cause, a matter of basic
importance to shareholders,' as does the Model Act.20
'Garrett, Capital and Surplus Vnder the New Corporation Statutes, inIra 239.
" Classification of directors is frequently referred to as the "stagger system." See LEvis D. GILBERT,
DIVIDENDS AND DEsiocrt"cy 189-9x (1956).
"x UNIPORm BUSINESS CoEPoRAInoN AcT § 28-111.
1
2 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT § 31.
"aId. § 3IA. 4Id. § 35.
" Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 8o5; ALA. CODE tit. 1O, § 23 (1940); WYOMING COMp. STAT. ANN. § 44-109(1945).
10Cf. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.58(C) (Page Supp. 1956).
' Cf. MicH. CoiF. LAws § 450.13(3) (1948); N.C. GEN. STAT. 55-25(b) (Supp. 1955).
x UNIFoRM BUSINESS CORPORATON AcT § 27-H.
'o See HENRY W. BALLENTINE, CORX'OATIONS 435 (1946).
'o MODEL BUSINESS CoPssoRATIoIr Act § 3 6A.
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Little that is modern, then, has been supplied by the Model Act's "new look"
with respect to the election of directors. For the most part, the Model Act's sec-
tions, either directly or optionally, restrict or fail adequately to protect this basic
shareholder right.
2. Fundamental changes
The Uniform Act affords shareholders the right to amend the articles of in-
corporation.21 It also empowers them to amend the bylaws and expressly provides
that director amendment of bylaws is "subject to the power of the shareholder to
change or repeal such by-laws."22 As a further shareholder safeguard, it provides,
in addition, that the directors shall not make or alter any bylaw fixing their
"qualifications, classification, term of office or compensation."23
Under the Model Act, by way of contrast, the articles or charter may be amended
only if the board of directors has adopted a resolution setting forth the proposed
amendment 4 It is also expressly stated that "the power to alter, amend or repeal
the by-laws or adopt new by-laws shall be vested in the board of directors unless
reserved to the shareholders by the articles of incorporation."" Here, it is apparent
that the Model Act has, indeed, a distinctly "new look," in that it imposes substantial
limitations upon shareholders with respect to their traditional rights to initiate and
to achieve fundamental changes and to amend the corporate bylaws.2
The Model Act, furthermore, substantially diminishes stockholder rights in the
case of management-initiated fundamental changes. While the Uniform Act accords
dissenters' rights in the event of sale, lease, or exchange of the corporation's assets,
merger, consolidation, or other fundamental changes, 7 the Model Act provides
merely for class voting on amendments of the articles or charter, without regard
to whether they involve fundamental changes,2 and accords dissenters' rights only
in the event of a 'sale or mortgage of assets in the regular course of business, a
merger, or a consolidation.29
Dissenters' rights, like charter and bylaw amendments, it is plain, receive more
restrictive treatment under the Model Act than under the Uniform Act. Again,
shareholder protection is sacrificed, and wider powers are given to management.
3. Disclosure and participation
Basic to the effective exercise of the shareholder's traditional rights respecting both
election of directors and fundamental changes is his right to receive information
2 UsNFom BUSINESS CoRPoPATmoN Act § 38-I.2 1d. § 26-I and II. 23Id. 26-111.
"
4 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION Act S 54(a). 2 1d. § 25.
"
5 See Emerson, Vital Weaknesses in the New Virginia Corporation Law, 42 VA. L. REV. 489, 511-13,
527-28 (1956); Note, Exclusive Control of the Adoption and Amendment of By-Laws or Regnulatio
by the Corporate Directors, 25 U. Cm. L. REV. 362 (956).
2 5 UNIFORm BusINEss CoRORA'nON Aar H9 42, 48.
"sMODEL BUSINESS CoE.OROrx r Acr S 55; see also Emerson, Vital Weaknesses in the New Virginia
Corporation Law, 42 VA. L. REV. 489 (x956).
"' MODEL BUSINESS CORPo.Aw-om AcT §§ 71, 74.
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and to participate in corporation affairs. Disclosure and participation are also
matters of importance in connection with submission of shareholder proposals, 30 the
conduct of proxy contests,3 ' and the prosecution of derivative suits. These matters
may be viewed in the context of the provisions for inspection of books and records,
availability of shareholder voting lists, and dissemination of financial statements
3 2
The Uniform Act gives to every shareholder a substantially unencumbered right
"to examine, in person or by agent or attorney, at any reasonable time or times, for
any reasonable purpose, the share register, books of account and records of the
proceedings of the shareholders and directors and to make extracts therefrom."33
The Model Act contrasts sharply, in that it provides, as do the statutes of a few states,
that a shareholder to be entitled to inspect must have been a holder "of record
for at least 6 months immediately preceding his demand or ... the holder of record
of at least 5% of all the outstanding shares."3 4  Moreover, while the Model Act
provides that a voting list shall be made available to shareholders,-5 the ten-day
limit on availability is so short as to render meaningless the original intention
of the voting-list statutes-namely, to facilitate communication among shareholders30
The Uniform Act provides for the filing of annual reports with "adequate in-
formation as to the financial condition of the corporations. '3 7  The Model Act
requires the mailing to shareholders, on written request, of the corporation's "most
recent financial statements showing in reasonable detail its assets and liabilities and
the results of its operations. 38  To the extent that the Model Act's section requires
dissemination of financial statements, it represents a noticeable advance over the
Uniform Act. Both acts, however, are extremely vague as to such matters as the
management's time limit for furnishing shareholders financial statements, as well
as to the form and content of those provided.
In summary, therefore, the Model Act seriously abridges the shareholder's in-
spection rights, is quite outdated in its voting-list availability provisions, and is both
vague and inadequate with respect to the furnishing of financial information.
As has already been pointed out, the "new look" in the Model Act also limits
"See Ledes, Emerson, Freeman, Gilbert, Bayne, and Slavin, Proper Subject: A Symposium, 34 U.
DET. L. J. 517 (I957).
' See Bayne and Emerson, The Virginia-Carolina Chemieal Corporation Proxy Contest: A Case Study
of the SEC's New Rule 240.14a-l1 and Schedule z4B, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 8ox (957); FRANK D.
EMERSON AND FRANELIN C. LATCRAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A BROADER OUrTLooK FoR CORpoRA-
IONs 5r-70 (I954) (concerning the Sparks-Withington proxy contest).
" For a comparative analysis of the law in England, Canada, South Africa, France, and Brazil re-
specting these matters, see Emerson, The Comparative Position of the Minority Shareholder in Selected
Countries, 3 How. L.J. 86 (957).
" UNIFoRm BusiNESS CoRPoRA~xoN AcT § 3 5-IV.
"MODEL BusiNEss CORPOR1ON ACT § 46.
8r Id. § 29.
"See Magill v. North American Refractories Co., 128 A.2d 233 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1956), 129 A.2d
411 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1957); Note, Shareholder Voting List Statutes-Are They Ejyective?, 26 U. QCr. L.
REV. 288 (1957); and Emerson, Vital Weaknesses in the New Virginia Corporation Law, 42 VA. L.
REV. 489, 513 (x956).
"UNFORM BUSINESS CoRPORATIoN AcT § 36.
" MODEL BusiNEss COP poRATON AcT § 46.
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the shareholder's right to elect directors, restricts or eliminates his rights in con-
nection with fundamental changes, and impairs his right to amend the bylaws.
These developments would suggest that corporate behavior conforms to requisite
high standards and that safeguards and limitations on managerial powers are not
needed. It remains to inquire into whether, in fact, this is so.
II
BEHAVIOR
Several recent studies have concerned themselves with corporate officers, junior
executives, and corporate power and its philosophical implications. Their observa-
tions, insights, and distilled conclusions, therefore, may, perhaps, afford a valid
basis for evaluating the emerging statutory treatment of management-shareholder
relationships.
A. Corporate Officers
The Big Business Executive 9 is an interesting starting point, for it presents a
composite profile, drawn from a survey, of the chief executive of the business corpora-
tions. Typically, while still relatively young and inexperienced, he obtained a minor
position with the corporation. Gradually, he worked up, through operations or
production, to a vice-presidency, from which he was promoted to the presidency
at the age of fifty-two. Although he has specialized professional training, he has
never practiced independently, nor has he at any time run a business of his own, as
his father did. He is a business administrator-a bureaucrat-with little job experi-
ence outside his own corporation. His investment in his company is nominal, usually
less than .i per cent of the outstanding stock. He is sixty-one years of age and will
probably be seventy when he retires.
Professor Newcomer feels that this profile differs in at least three respects from
the ideal.40 First, the president is usually named from among the corporation's
officers, probably without sufficient consideration of possibly better talent available
elsewhere. Secondly, the chief executive is a specialist in engineering, law, or
perhaps some other field not directly related to his job of administration. Thirdly,
he is not appointed until he has reached an age too old to permit an extended period
of administration prior to retirement. Professor Newcomer also finds evidence that
these shortcomings may be matters of importance in the circumstance that the
qualifications of executives of fast-growing companies came closer to the ideal than
those of slow-growing companies.
Findings of another survey are generally similar. In Big Business Leaders in
America, it is stated that "the typical career pattern is a bureaucratic one in business
today, just as the typical business organization is primarily bureaucratic."'" Careers,
it is said, are built largely on formal education, acquisition of management skills
" MABEL NEWCOMER, TnE BIG BUSINESS ExEcutnvE 149-50 (x955).
40 Ibid.
, WLuAM L; WARNER AND JAMES C. ABEGGLEN, BIG BUSINESS LEADERS IN AmIERICA 215-z6 (1955).
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in the white-collar hierarchy, and movement through the far-flung systems of
technicians and lower-level management personnel into top management.
Another writer draws some additional conclusions of an obviously provocative
character. In The Power Elite, a Columbia University sociology professor asserts
that corporate chief executives and other members of the power elite of America
have no ideology, feel the need of none, rule "naked of ideas," and "manipulate
without attempted justification." "It is this mindlessness," the reader is told, "that
is the true higher immorality of our time; for, with it, there is associated the
organized irresponsibility that is today the most important characteristic of the
American system of corporate power. 42
B. Junior Executives
Behavior data relating to the junior executive is also pertinent. On the basis of
the surveys already referred to, a corporation's junior executives of today provide
its chief executive of tomorrow. And in the meantime, they have an opportunity
to participate in corporate decision-making and policy-formation.
The corporate junior executive, with other employees of large organizations,
was examined in considerable detail in The Organization Man. He emerges there
as overly imbued with an attitude of cooperation and little disposition to critical
analysis. He is seen as "denying that there is-or should be-a conflict between
the individual and organization," and this is regarded by the author as both "bad
for the organization," and "worse for the individual," because "in soothing him,"
it "robs him of the intellectual armor he so badly needs.' Fault is also found with
the "denial that there is a conflict between the individual and society," for, as the
author points out, "it is the price of being an individual that he must face these
conflicts," and "in seeking an ethic that offers a spurious peace of mind . . . does he
tyrannize himself." '4
C. Power and Responsibility
Two other recent volumes deal in particular with the issues of power and re-
sponsibility in the corporate world. In one, Power and Morality in a Business
Society,44 the authors, having disposed of conscience alone as a solvent,45 argue for a
taming of power by resort to reason and human association. In developing their
theme, particularly in articulating the concept of human association, the authors
call for participation by "small, independent groups," even if they tend to be "self-
centered and oblivious to the larger good of the community." They serve, it is
asserted, a social good, principally in three ways: (i) retarding resort to technical
12 CaILES W. MILLS, THE PowER ELmT 342 (1956).
"VILLIAm H. WHYE , JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN 14-15 (956).
"SYLVIA K. SELEKMAN AND BENYAMIN M. SELERMAN, POwER AND MORALITY IN A BUSINESS SOCIETY
99, 129, X34 (1956).
"See also ADOLF A. BERLE, JR, TmE 2oTH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 61-i x5 (1954); Emerson
and Latcham, Law and the Future: Corporation Law, 51 Nw. U. L. Rev. 196 204-05 (1956);
SELEKMAN AND SELEU.tAN, Op. cit. supra note 44, at 93-96; WALTON H. HAMmTON, THE POLITICS OF
INDUSTRY 137-42 (3957)-
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decisions by their concern for efficiency, costs, and profits; (2) restraining authority
and forestalling capricious and arbitrary supervision; and (3) deterring power drives
of individuals who might exploit for selfish purposes.
The Politics of Industry, the most recent of the several publications referred to,
follows a description of the actual modes of power and behavior in modern society,
with a concluding chapter summing up the contributions of conscience, commission,
and competition as levers operating upon the exercise of power. The author finds
that, while today's economy invites regulation, it is imperative that "the minority
be allowed to have its chance, and that there be a thousand points in the larger
system at which creative thought and effort may be applied."40
CONCLUSION
Contemporary corporation statutes, as exemplified by the Model Act, do not,
it is submitted, accord with the realities and needs of our society. At a time when
management power is widely regarded as becoming increasingly dominant, the
Model Act is substantially restricting the rights of shareholders democratically to
participate in corporate affairs. The provisions of the Uniform Act, drafted nearly
thirty years ago, are, in a number of respects, more nearly in harmony with the
available data bearing on current corporate behavior.
'a HAILTN, Op. Cit. supra note 45, at z67.
